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To the Editor: Bowen’s review of educational 
strategies that can be used to promote clinical di-
agnostic reasoning (Nov. 23 issue)1 does not suf-
ficiently emphasize the concept of premature clo-
sure. Acceptance of a diagnosis before sufficient 
verification has occurred and failure to consider 
plausible alternatives once a diagnosis has been 
reached2,3 are common causes of diagnostic error 
and can occur at any level of training.3,4 One pos-
sible effect of anchoring — the inability to assimi-
late subsequent or evolving data — is a particu-
larly important contributing factor in premature 
closure and may lead to faulty synthesis of infor-
mation.5 The risk of premature closure may be 
greatest when learners are pressed for time or 
expected to have a level of expertise they have not 
yet attained. Premature closure may be just as like-
ly to result from an “unlucky” adherence to an 
illness script as from gaps in knowledge. Clinical 
educators should encourage learners to continu-
ously integrate new information into the decision-
making process.
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To the Editor: We agree with Bowen that clini-
cal educators need to understand and analyze the 
varied diagnostic reasoning strategies applied by 
novices such as medical students to help them 
improve their performance. However, the diag-
nostic reasoning schema in Figure 1 of the article 
appears to oversimplify this process. Because of 
minimal clinical experience, the novice generally 
has poorly formed illness scripts and will often 
generate hypotheses using a pathophysiological, 
probabilistic, or rule-based representation of the 
problem (skills acquired during problem- or case-
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based learning).1,2 Such hypotheses are often more 
numerous, broader, and less accurate than those of 
experts and must be refined by the novice during 
the interview with the patient and during the phys-
ical examination, while the novice looks for the 
specific symptoms, risk factors, and signs that al-
low for iterative reweighting of the clinical diag-
nostic possibilities. We believe that acknowledg-
ment of alternative bases for hypothesis generation 
and of the iterative nature of hypothesis refinement 
will further assist educators in improving students’ 
diagnostic reasoning strategies.
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To the Editor: We use the technique outlined by 
Bowen in our own teaching. However, Bowen does 
not address the possibility of an incorrect diagno-
sis obtained through valid diagnostic reasoning. 
The clinical teacher should allow for this possi-
bility as part of the case presentation. Correcting 
an incorrect diagnosis is a critical skill that re-
quires the identification of alternative steps in the 
development of a representation of the problem 
and reevaluation of the differential diagnosis to 
include other conditions that may have features 
similar to those of the case under consideration. 
Thus, Figure 1 of the article should have included 
a final step in which diagnostic reasoning leads 
to either a correct or an incorrect diagnosis. When 
a diagnosis is incorrect, the reasoning process ex-
pands to include the pertinent data for the missed 
diagnosis, leading the learner to improve the prob-
lem representation or illness script.
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To the Editor: Bowen’s article excludes consid-
eration of the fact that the diagnostic thought pro-
cess depends on the situation. In some situations 
(e.g., a medical emergency or a one-time consulta-
tion), it is more parsimonious to use a reverse para-
digm: identify and rule out (and treat) the most 
urgent or life- or health-threatening possibilities, 
and carry this approach through multiple iterations 
over time. In other words, instead of initially 
seeking the “right” diagnosis through an elabo-
rate diagnostic process, one seeks to avoid the 
“wrong” one.
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To the Editor: Bowen addresses the challenge 
of how educators can facilitate learning as their 
trainees acquire diagnostic reasoning skills. The 
primacy of information-gathering skills was re-
cently illustrated when our diabetes consulting ser-
vice was asked to see an elderly man with a long 
history of diabetes mellitus. The clinical informa-
tion obtained was that despite twice-daily admin-
istration of premixed insulin, the capillary glu-
cose readings performed at home were often in 
the range of 20 mmol per liter. At the bedside, I 
asked the patient how much insulin he took in the 
morning. His response was most instructive: “I give 
myself 40 units when my sugar reading is high.” 
My next question was what he did when his sugar 
reading was not high. He replied that he skipped 
his dose, thereby revealing the source of the prob-
lem. My trainee learned that determining that 
something does not occur is as important as de-
termining that it does occur.
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To the Editor: Bowen describes the analytic por-
tion of diagnostic reasoning primarily as a discrete 
step occurring between the acquisition of data and 
the determination of the most probable diagnosis. 
In our experience, diagnostic reasoning is almost 
invariably a dynamic, iterative process. The prob-
abilities of several competing diagnoses are as-
sessed and then concurrently refined and amend-
ed on the basis of further inquiry.
Clinical diagnostic reasoning should be con-
sidered a tool to maximize the quality of care in 
a cost-effective manner. The most probable diag-
nosis is frequently not the most important diag-
nostic consideration in achieving this goal. Al-
though gout was the most probable diagnosis in 
the case presented in Bowen’s article, the expert 
resident might have been well advised to address 
the less likely but more worrisome possibility of 
septic arthritis by further examining the history 
of episodes.
Bowen’s endorsement of cognitive tools such 
as illness scripts and anchoring prototypes war-
rants qualification. These are certainly essential 
assets in the diagnostician’s armamentarium. 
However, they can also easily lead to fallacious 
reasoning, occasionally with disastrous conse-
quences.1,2
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The author replies: I agree with Grossman 
and Rodríguez that diagnostic reasoning is “a dy-
namic” process. However, illness scripts, anchor-
ing prototypes, and pattern recognition are de-
scriptions of mental processes, not diagnostic 
tools, as these authors suggest. McColl and Groves 
note that novices may tend to use a pathophysio-
logical strategy for reasoning more often than they 
use pattern recognition. Neither strategy is likely 
to be used entirely in isolation. Both are concep-
tual models for the reasoning process. Similarly, 
Echols and colleagues note that coming to the 
wrong conclusion is the last stage of diagnosis, 
suggesting a change in Figure 1 of our article. The 
figure is not meant to represent an external view 
of a teacher observing a learner make a correct or 
incorrect diagnosis. Rather, it is one of many pos-
sible schematics for the steps clinicians are likely to 
take in their minds during the reasoning process.
Clinicians miss diagnoses for many reasons,1 
premature closure among them, as Levy and col-
leagues point out. Clinical teachers must recognize 
that learners may come to premature closure and 
must probe learners’ thinking and interview and 
examine patients directly when there is sufficient 
doubt about the accuracy of a diagnosis. All cli-
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nicians are at risk for premature closure,2 wheth-
er or not they are trainees, when experience with 
the clinical problem at hand is lacking or when the 
clinician is pressed for time. With increasing age 
and experience, physicians are more, not less, 
likely to go with their first hypothesis.3 This 
increasing reliance on early data does not neces-
sarily result in poorer diagnosis.4 For complex, ill-
defined clinical problems, new diagnostic consid-
erations can be triggered at any point, and new 
questioning strategies emerge as a result. Once 
the clinician is satisfied, a diagnosis is rendered 
with more or less certainty about the conclusion. 
If the clinician is not satisfied, the reasoning pro-
cess continues.
Diagnostic reasoning depends on the context. 
The context includes “the situation,” as Marsh de-
scribes. Clinical teachers also teach weighting of 
the diagnostic possibilities, “ruling out” must-not-
miss diagnoses while continuing to search for the 
correct diagnosis. The situation can also influence 
which diagnoses learners consider. For example, 
learners who can readily recognize community-
acquired pneumonia in hospitalized patients may 
not recognize the same presentation in the out-
patient clinic until the teacher points it out.
Sorisky reminds us of the importance of role 
modeling. From experience, we build in memory 
repositories of questioning strategies that work 
particularly well and those that fail us. Sorisky’s 
learner might benefit from a deliberate discussion 
about interviewing strategies. One cannot assume 
that the clinical teacher’s “aha” is the same as the 
learner’s.
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Acromegaly
To the Editor: In Melmed’s otherwise excellent 
review of acromegaly (Dec. 14 issue),1 the clinical 
myth that headache is due to a local tumor effect 
is perpetuated in Table 1. It has been established 
in a prospective study that the size of a pituitary 
tumor does not determine the headache presen-
tation.2 Moreover, the phenotype of headache pre-
sentations is wide, including migraine and the 
trigeminal autonomic cephalalgias, particularly 
cluster headache.3 An important clinical lesson in 
this context is the overrepresentation of cluster-
headache–like presentations in patients with ac-
romegaly and thus the higher yield in searching 
for pituitary-tumor–related disease when one sees 
atypical headache presentations.
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To the Editor: Melmed does not emphasize the 
unique and highly characteristic visual abnormali-
ties in patients with acromegaly. Nearly 20% of 
patients with this condition have some sort of 
visual-field abnormality.1 Most of these defects 
occur because of compression of the optic chiasm 
by the enlarged pituitary.2 Bilateral visual defects 
are more common than unilateral defects, with 
bitemporal hemianopsia and superior bitemporal 
quadranopsia being the most commonly detect-
ed defects.3 Other, less common defects include 
unilateral temporal hemianopsia, superotemporal 
quadranopsia, and inferotemporal quadranop-
sia. The earliest visual-field defect is usually in the 
superior temporal quadrant. In general, patients 
with visual-field defects tend to have higher lev-
els of growth hormone and are usually younger 
than patients without such defects.4 Also, larger 
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